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HYPERPARTISAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Michael S. Kang
ABSTRACT
Hyperpartisanship dominates modern American politics and government,
but today’s politics are strikingly different from the preceding period of
American history, a Cold War Era when bipartisanship and ideological
moderation predominated. Hyperpartisanship was not the salient dynamic in
American politics when campaign finance law began, and as a result, campaign
finance law developed under strikingly different assumptions about American
politics than the current prevailing circumstances. Today’s campaign finance
law, inherited from this preceding era, is thus mismatched to the campaign
finance of today. Campaign finance law focuses on individual candidates as the
central actors in fundraising and misses the role of parties in organizing the
campaign finance landscape. It therefore both systematically underestimates the
risk that parties pose in collectivizing the potential for campaign finance
corruption and overestimates the First Amendment values promoted by modern
campaign finance when the parties today focus so heavily on mobilizing their
base and preaching to the choir.
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INTRODUCTION
Hyperpartisanship dominates modern American politics and government.1
American politicians and voters are more sharply divided along party lines in
how they identify, vote, and think about politics than they have in more than a
century. Today’s politics, though, are strikingly different from the preceding
period of American history, a Cold War Era when bipartisanship and ideological
moderation dominated the scene. And today’s campaign finance law, inherited
from this preceding era, is poorly suited for today’s new world of hyperpartisan
campaign finance.
During the Cold War Era, American politics were not nearly so partisan, let
alone hyperpartisan. The contemporary notion of “hyperpartisanship,” which I
adopt here, assumes something like the Cold War baseline of bipartisanship as
the norm, in line with the way that Americans born and raised during that era
still understand its milder partisanship as historically regular.2 Compared to
today, the major parties were more centrist and not nearly so ideologically welldefined. Voters were less clearly divided along party lines and ideology. Voters
who identified with one party voted nonetheless for candidates of the other party,
routinely splitting their ballots on election day.3
Elite bipartisanship mirrored bipartisanship among voters. When Baker v.
Carr4 was decided during the heart of the Cold War, the two major parties
overlapped ideologically in the U.S. Senate to a shocking degree by today’s
standards. Republican and Democratic politicians regularly coalesced into
bipartisan coalitions opposing bipartisan coalitions, particularly on civil rights
and foreign policy.5 Almost a quarter of Republicans were more liberal than the
most conservative Democrat, and almost a quarter of Democrats were more

1
There is a substantive distinction between hyperpolarization, characterized by extreme differentiation
between the major parties, and hyperpartisanship, characterized by extreme antagonism between the major
parties. I do not explore this distinction here and treat the two together as hyperpartisanship for my purposes in
this Article.
2
See, e.g., Laura Stoker & M. Kent Jennings, Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 619 (2008) (explaining generational differences in partisan polarization).
3
See Amber Phillips, Is Split-Ticket Voting Officially Dead?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016, 9:41 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/17/is-split-ticket-voting-officially-dead
(demonstrating the rise in split-ticket voting from 1968 to 1992).
4
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5
See Drew Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congress-began-inthe-1970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since; see also Ideological Breakdown of Congressional Vote on
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1964/h182 (last visited
May 30, 2021) (showing bipartisan voting support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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conservative than the most liberal Republican.6 The pressing questions of
election law surrounded race and regional discrimination, not overweening
partisanship and manipulation of election rules for party advantage. This Cold
War bipartisanship was virtually unprecedented in American politics and
strikingly different than today’s conditions of hyperpartisanship.
Modern campaign finance law began, like all the rest of election law, during
this Cold War period. Until the 1960s, federal courts abstained almost
completely from “political” cases under versions of the political question
doctrine. It was not until the one-person, one-vote cases, beginning with Baker
v. Carr in 1962, when federal courts began engaging with election law. The 1965
passage of the Voting Rights Act further required courts to decide questions of
state and local election law, and along with the one-person, one-vote cases,
opened the door to broader judicial engagement with the right to vote under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the Watergate scandals, Congress
enacted comprehensive campaign finance regulation that quickly required courts
to develop the constitutional law of campaign finance under the First
Amendment.7 All this election law development happened to occur when
American politics featured the lowest levels of partisanship in American history.
Election law, including campaign finance law, therefore began and
developed within a Cold War political context where the parties managed to
cooperate, overlapped ideologically to a significant degree, and won elections
by competing for undecided centrist voters in a way that has been nearly
forgotten today. As a consequence, election law created during this Cold War
window of bipartisanship never confronted or contemplated the intensity of
partisanship that has reemerged today, nor the party politics and campaign
finance that today’s partisanship has spawned.
To overgeneralize only a bit, today’s parties reflexively oppose each other,
do not overlap ideologically at all, and focus on mobilizing their base (or
demobilizing the other party’s base) rather than winning over undecided
centrists. Following the Cold War, the parties neatly sorted into ideologically
cohesive teams of voters and politicians that remain doggedly loyal to their
party, election after election, up and down the ballot. Party affiliation has
increased among voters since the Cold War, while partisanship increasingly
dictates how people vote.8 The party switching and split-ticket voting that were
6

See Desilver, supra note 5.
See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Forty Year War on Money in Politics: Watergate, FECA, and the Future
of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 804 (2016).
8
See Nathaniel Rakich, Everything Is Partisan and Correlated and Boring, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 20,
7
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relatively common during the Cold War largely disappeared, as voters stick with
their party throughout their ballot and from year to year.9 Partisan animus also
rose sharply, with roughly half of partisans today feeling “fearful” of the
opposing party, and roughly a third feeling that the other side is “so misguided
that [it] threaten[s] the nation’s well-being.”10 Voter partisanship again mirrors
hyperpartisanship among politicians. Democrats and Republicans in Congress,
for instance, are more polarized than they have been in more than a century.11
The ideological overlap that characterized Congress at the time of Baker v. Carr
is completely gone today.12
Campaign finance law is thus mismatched to the party politics of today, and
therefore, the party campaign finance of today. Today’s politics, and campaign
finance, are far more party-centered than they were when the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA)13 was enacted, comprehensively amended, and
subsequently interpreted by courts. In addition, today’s campaign finance
spending tends toward base mobilization—preaching to and motivating the
choir, rather than converting the undecided—far more than it did during the Cold
War Era.14 Rather than tacking to the center and engaging each other for
undecided voters, the parties today turn inward during campaign season and
further polarize toward the ideological extremes far more than they once did.
However, today’s campaign finance law, borne of a less partisan, less partycentered era, still targets quid pro quo corruption between individual donor and
particular candidate, while largely looking past the potential for collective
corruption mediated through political parties that are now at the heart of national
politics.15 I explore these developments here.

2018, 6:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/everything-is-partisan-and-correlated-and-boring.
9
See Alan Abramowitz & Steven W. Webster, Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties
but Behave Like Rabid Partisans, 39 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 119, 119–20 (2018).
10
See Nolan D. McCaskill, Pew Study: Partisan Divide Widest in 25 Years, POLITICO (June 22, 2016,
12:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/partisan-divide-pew-study-224650.
11
See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011).
12
See Hahrie Han & David Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party
Polarization After the Second World War, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 505, 506 (2007).
13
52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146.
14
See Jonah Goldberg, Appealing to the Center Is No Longer a Winnable Strategy to Lure Voters, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-goldbergmoderate-voters-bad-voting-strategy-0820-story.html.
15
See Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Super PACs Outmaneuver Outdated Rules to Leave Voters in the Dark,
OPENSECRETS (Mar. 18, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/03/sunshine-week-2020super-pacs-loophole.
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In Part I, I briefly survey the history of American partisanship from the
intensity of the nineteenth century through its Cold War recession, before its
resurgence since the 1990s into today. I survey this history only briefly because
I have written about this history in great detail elsewhere.16 In Part II, I explain
how the coincidence of the Cold War lull in partisanship and the beginning of
election law helped shape campaign finance law in certain directions.
Hyperpartisanship was not a salient dynamic in American politics when
campaign finance law began, and as a result, campaign finance law developed
under strikingly different assumptions about American politics than the current
prevailing circumstances. Under modern hyperpartisanship, our newly
centralized and ideologically cohesive parties grew into the central hub for
modern campaign finance.
In Part III, I describe the consequences of the mismatch between campaign
finance law from the Cold War and modern campaign finance of today.
Campaign finance law still focuses on individual candidates as the central actors
in fundraising and misses the role of parties in organizing the campaign finance
landscape. It therefore both systematically underestimates the risk that parties
pose in collectivizing the potential for campaign finance corruption and
overestimates the First Amendment values promoted by modern campaign
finance when the parties today focus so heavily on mobilizing their base and
preaching to the choir.
I.

THE COLD WAR ORIGIN OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

The Cold War was a nearly singular era in American politics, characterized
by an unprecedented period of bipartisanship and ideological moderation
between the major parties. This Part describes Cold War party politics and how
the development of campaign finance law during the era was tailored to and
based on Cold War political conditions.
A. A History of American Partisanship Through the Cold War
American history is a history of American partisanship. Despite the Framers’
famous antipathy for factions, the Founding Generation immediately broke into
rival parties over the very ratification of the Constitution. The Federalists and
Anti-Federalists campaigned against each other from the start and continued in

16
See Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379 (2020) [hereinafter Kang,
Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering]; Michael S. Kang, Voting Rights from Judge Frank Johnson to Modern
Hyperpolarization, 71 ALA. L. REV. 793 (2020) [hereinafter Kang, Voting Rights].
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roughly the same alignment in the form of the Federalist and DemocraticRepublican Parties following the constitutional setup.
Partisanship of the early era was startlingly intense even by modern
standards and would continue nearly as intensely for more than a century.
American politics enjoyed a short break from partisanship during the so-called
Era of Good Feelings of the 1810s, when what we today call hyperpartisanship
receded for its only respite until the Cold War. This short break from
partisanship during the Monroe Presidency promptly gave way to the birth of
mass democratic parties under Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van
Buren. These mass parties broke from earlier political tradition and engaged in
popular organization and mass mobilization of committed voters. Walter Dean
Burnham would later describe nineteenth century politics as militaristic
partisanship between two “armies drawn up for combat” with “highly stable
partisan commitments in the mass electorate and a parallel cultural pattern of
intense participation.”17
The robust partisanship of the nineteenth century into the early twentieth
century dictated that the major parties focus on mobilization of their base rather
than conversion of any undecided voters. As Burnham put it, “Little was to be
gained by attempting to convert a large ‘floating’ or independent vote, for the
good reason that almost none existed.”18 Under these conditions, voter turnout
routinely approached 80% of eligible voters by the end of the nineteenth
century.19 What’s more, our best historical estimates are that voters tended
overwhelmingly to vote the party ticket up and down the ballot over multiple
elections. The partisan vote for state legislative, gubernatorial, and presidential
races correlated at higher than 90%, with roughly 90% of voters consistently
voting for the same party in consecutive elections.20 In other words, party
affiliation among voters became common and robust, with little ballot splitting
or party switching between elections.

17
WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 72–
73 (1970).
18
Id. at 73.
19
See Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/statistics/data/voter-turnout-in-presidential-elections (last visited May 30, 2021).
20
See, e.g., JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838–1893, at 153 (1991); PAUL
KLEPPNER, WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, RONALD P. FORMISANO, SAMUEL P. HAYS, RICHARD JENSEN & WILLIAM
G. SHADE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 18 (1981); Thomas P. Alexander, The
Dimension of Voter Partisan Constancy in Presidential Elections from 1840 to 1860, in ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
ANTEBELLUM POLITICS 1840–1860, at 70, 113 (Stephen E. Maizlish & John J. Kushma eds., 1982); Edward L.
Glaesar & Bryce A. Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political Geography, 20 J. ECON. PERSPS. 119, 125
(2006).
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Sharp partisanship among voters was no surprise because politicians from
the major parties were similarly polarized. Congressional voting was highly
partisan from nearly the beginning of the Republic. From at least the midnineteenth century through the early twentieth century, political scientists
identify no ideological overlap between elected congressmen and senators
across the major parties based on their voting records.21 Indeed, Michael Barber
and Nolan McCarty show that partisanship explains more than 85% of U.S.
House roll-call voting from the era.22 Joanne Freeman has highlighted the
frequency of partisan violence between congressional representatives and has
located more than seventy incidents of physical attacks between congressmen
from 1830 to 1860 during a stretch of elevated partisanship leading up to the
Civil War.23 As a consequence, national politics featured two polarized parties
with strong internal cohesion and few incentives to reach out to the other side.
Still, this form of hyperpartisanship began to shift subtly around the turn of
the twentieth century. The country split into what James McGregor Burns
termed as a four-party system, an organization of regional fiefdoms within which
partisan competition ebbed.24 The Democratic Party dominated the South in oneparty rule, distorted by the politics of white supremacy, based on Black
disenfranchisement and exploitation.25 The feeble Republican Party of the era,
in V.O. Key’s words, “scarcely deserve[d] the name of party” in the South.26
Republicans instead enjoyed greater success in the Midwest and Northeast, split
between moderates on the eastern seaboard and conservatives in the rest of the
country.27 Democrats and Republicans were less ideologically polarized as the
Cold War kicked off. Conservative Republicans and Dixiecrat Democrats
commonly joined forces against civil rights legislation pushed by moderate
Republicans and liberal Democrats outside the South.

21
Han & Brady, supra note 12, at 505, 508–09; Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and
Consequences of Polarization, in NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19, 21 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo
Martin eds., 2013).
22
Barber & McCarty, supra note 21, at 20.
23
JOANNE B. FREEMAN, THE FIELD OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE IN CONGRESS AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR 55
(2018).
24
JAMES MCGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 257
(1963).
25
See Boris Heersink & Jeffrey A. Jenkins, The Republican Party Is White and Southern: How Did That
Happen?, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/07/
republican-party-is-white-southern-how-did-that-happen.
26
V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 277 (1949).
27
See, e.g., Historical Elections of the House of Representatives: The Election of 1900, U. RICH.,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/congress/#show=winner&view=map&year=1900&xyz=0.5/0.5/1Rich. (last
visited May 30, 2021).
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By the mid-twentieth century and the start of the Cold War, American
partisanship had shifted importantly from its history. As Hahrie Han and David
Brady document, congressional polarization sharply declined from the 1920s
onward such that the parties ideologically overlapped to a significant degree in
Congress for the first time.28 Before the 1920s, basically no Democrat was more
conservative in terms of congressional roll-call voting than the most liberal
Republican, and vice versa, no Republican was more liberal than the most
conservative Democrat.29 By 1949, however, about 10% of House Democrats
were more conservative than the most liberal 10% of House Republicans.30 By
1969, almost a quarter of Democratic Senators were more conservative than the
most liberal Republicans, and vice versa.31
It is no surprise then that Republicans and Democrats were able to cooperate
across the aisle in ways that had been earlier unthinkable. Republicans and
Democrats routinely crossed party lines on matters of civil rights and foreign
policy. The parties were so little defined by ideology that the American Political
Science Association famously declared in 1950 that the major parties were
insufficiently polarized and too ideologically compatible.32 Indeed, as a sign of
the times, both major parties recruited the same person, General Dwight
Eisenhower, as their presidential nominee for the 1952 election.
For all these reasons, this Cold War period marked a singularly bipartisan
stretch of American politics when the two major parties collaborated in
unprecedented fashion. Broad bipartisan coalitions enacted the Marshall Plan,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and comprehensive
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act during the time. Regional
and racial concerns cross-cut party lines and dominated over partisan
considerations. What’s more, the major parties were internally diverse and less
cohesive than today. State- and local-level Republicans and Democrats did not
necessarily agree ideologically with their national-level counterparts. Socially
conservative, urban Democrats might have much more in common with
conservative Republicans than their liberal party comrades, and Southern
Democrats might have more in common with conservative Republicans from the
West or Midwest than their northeastern counterparts.

28

Han & Brady, supra note 12, at 512–16, 531.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1, 1–14 (1950).
29
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American voters were less partisan during the Cold War as well. Partisan
self-identification was historically low by any measure. The percentage of
Americans who identified as independent rather than associated with a major
party increased during the Cold War while partisan identification with either
major party decreased, particularly so for “strong” party identification.33
Furthermore, partisan identification was less predictive of vote choice during the
Cold War, with voters regularly voting for a different party’s presidential
candidate from year to year and more likely to split their ballot even in a given
election among candidates from different parties.34 Roughly a quarter of selfidentified partisans cast a vote for the other party’s candidates in the 1970s.35 In
fact, in 1972, 36% of Democrats reported that they actually voted for the
Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon,36 who managed to win 49 of
50 states in that year’s presidential election. As recently as the 1984 presidential
election, late in the Cold War, Ronald Reagan matched Nixon’s landslide victory
by winning almost 59% of the popular vote and 49 of 50 states over his opponent
Walter Mondale, who managed to win narrowly only his home state of
Minnesota.37 Party identification was not terribly predictive of a voter’s
ideological beliefs. The average Democrat and Republican identifier did not
differ dramatically by today’s standards, with partisanship and ideology
correlating at just 0.28.38
As a consequence, party politics revolved much more around competition
for a cross-party or swing vote than they had in the militaristic mobilization
politics of the nineteenth century (or as a preview, under today’s
hyperpartisanship).39 The foundational Columbia University studies of
American voters during the early Cold War introduced the notion of the “crosspressured” voter whose demographics, social context, and inherited partisan
33
See e.g., NORMAN H. NIE, SIDNEY VERBA & JOHN R. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER
363 (1976).
34
See BARRY C. BURDEN & DAVID C. KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR TICKETS 67 (2002);
Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. POL. 1, 5 (2009); Kenneth Mulligan, Partisan
Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government, 32 POL. PSYCH. 505, 514 (2011).
35
Pietro S. Nivola & William A. Galston, The Great Divide, AM. INT. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.theamerican-interest.com/2006/11/01/the-great-divide.
36
See Jack Rosenthal, Desertion Rate Doubles, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/
1972/11/09/archives/new-jersey-pages-desertion-rate-doubles-defectors-gave-nixon.html.
37
See 1984 Electoral Map, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/1984_Election/ (last visited May 30,
2021).
38
Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 619, 626 (2001).
39
See MATTHEW S. LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND
CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 9 (2009) (“For fifty years, political scientists—and political pundits—
argued that campaigns should focus on identifying and converting undecided voters: the ‘swing’ voters.”).
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affiliation “simultaneously support[] different sides” of the partisan divide.40
Such cross-pressured voters seemed less sure of their vote, took longer to decide
how to vote, and were less loyal to their chosen party than other voters.41 The
notion of the persuadable cross-pressured voter “with a foot in each candidate’s
camp” has been central to American politics and campaigns at least since then.42
Along these lines, Sunshine Hillygus and Todd Shields contend that roughly a
third of the presidential electorate would have been classified as persuadable
cross-pressured voters over this period, routinely larger than the winning margin
in presidential elections.43 The Cold War thus featured two ideologically
overlapping, centrist parties that tended to focus on what they saw as
persuadable swing voters as the key to winning elections.
B. The Birth of Campaign Finance Law
Campaign finance law largely began with the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 as comprehensively amended in 1974 following Watergate. Before
FECA, federal law long prohibited union and corporate electioneering and
restricted the campaign activities of government employees and contractors. But
under FECA, the federal government for the first time comprehensively
regulated federal campaign contributions and expenditures, imposed clear
source restrictions, and required financial disclosures for all campaign finance
actors from candidates to contributors to political committees and parties.44 Even
after the Court in Buckley v. Valeo struck down restrictions on independent
expenditures, the resulting constitutional regime for campaign finance law still
thoroughly regulated campaign contributions and left source restrictions and
disclosure obligations largely in place.45
This birth of campaign finance law coincided with the birth of the rest of
election law. As I have detailed elsewhere,46 for most of their history, American
courts almost always abstained from what they saw as “political” cases under
some form of the political question doctrine.47 Courts feared the lack of

40
BERNARD R. BERELSON, PAUL F. LAZASFELD & WILLIAM N. MCPHEE, VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION
FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 19 (1954).
41
See id. at 52–72; PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, BERNARD BERELSON & HAZEL GAUDET, THE PEOPLE’S
CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 19–33 (1948).
42
D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE VOTER: WEDGE ISSUES IN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 5 (2008).
43
Id. at 8.
44
52 U.S.C. § 30101.
45
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976).
46
See, e.g., Kang, Voting Rights, supra note 16, at 804.
47
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).
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judicially manageable standards and judicial entanglement with the “political
thicket” of partisan politics if they intervened into cases that would restructure
the political process.48 However, federal courts broke their reluctance with the
one-person, one-vote cases in the 1960s, beginning with Baker v. Carr.49 In these
cases, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative districting scheme for
virtually every state legislative and congressional seat as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause and mandated equal numbers of residents in each district.50 So
began the federal courts’ comprehensive oversight of the American election
process. Around the same time, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which necessitated judicial attention to nearly every aspect of the election
process. Federal courts likewise began entertaining challenges to various
hindrances to voting and promptly struck down restrictions based on poll taxes,51
bona fide residency,52 durational requirements,53 and property requirements.54
The passage of FECA and the concomitant development of campaign
finance law under the First Amendment occurred during this period. Just as with
redistricting and election administration, the comprehensive regulation of
federal campaign finance and the judicial establishment of the applicable
constitutional framework occurred at a historically low watermark for
partisanship during the Cold War. With the decline of partisanship, electoral
politics transitioned from the patronage-driven, party-centered era of the early
twentieth century to a new era of candidate-centered campaigns and elections.
With the growing pervasiveness of television, candidates relied less and less
on party organizations to mobilize winning majorities on their behalf and
became increasingly able to reach voters directly through campaign
advertising.55 Cold War voters, as I described, were less defined by ideology
than earlier partisans, and much more likely to vote based on the individual
candidate rather than faithful partisanship up and down the ballot from election
to election. Candidates could, and needed to, cultivate a campaign presence
through which voters could personally identify and support specific candidates
above and beyond party loyalty and party mobilization. At the same time, direct
48

Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
50
See id.
51
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
52
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
53
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
54
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
55
See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995) (tracing the historical transition from party-centric mobilization to candidate-centric
media politics).
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primaries were replacing boss-dominated nomination processes such that
candidates’ personal popularity with voters grew more critical than personal
favor from party bosses and their organizations. As a result, campaign financing
to pay for television advertising and appeals directly to voters superseded party
bosses and organizations in central importance at the very moment modern
campaign finance law was being created.56 The traditional role of parties had
apparently passed, so much so that political scientists of the time lamented “the
ruins of the traditional partisan regime.”57 Martin Wattenberg’s book, The
Decline of American Political Parties,58 later encapsulated the widespread sense
of the time that “the two major parties are no longer as central as they once were
in tying people’s everyday concerns to their choice in the political system.”59
Under these conditions, political parties may have seemed incidental to
campaign finance law relative to the prominent center stage of candidatefocused fundraising. As one political scientist put it, parties at the time “seemed
so irrelevant or unpopular that candidates often avoided using the party label in
campaigns while party organizations seemed almost absent in elections.”60 As a
result, “[r]egulating parties appeared as an afterthought” in congressional
deliberations over the FECA amendments of 1974, and the far greater attention
to the regulation of candidate committees and PACs “revealed the marginalized
position of American political parties.”61 According to Ray La Raja’s account
of the legislative history, a late version of the FECA amendment bill lumped in
political parties with non-party political committees and subjected them to
exactly the same $5,000 contribution limit on donations to any PAC.62 Only a
last-minute amendment from Republicans, who benefitted from stronger party
campaign finance, raised the contribution limit for parties to $10,000.63
As a consequence, modern campaign finance law happened to begin during
a Cold War period when parties and partisanship were far less salient and
56
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (“The increasing importance of the communications
media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large
sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy.”).
57
Walter Dean Burnham, The Reagan Heritage, in THE ELECTION OF 1988: REPORTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 24 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1989).
58
See generally MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952–1992
(1994) (assessing the nature and reasons for the decline of political partisanship in the electorate).
59
EDWARD S. GREENBERG & BENJAMIN I. PAGE, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 269 (1997).
60
Raymond J. La Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress, 9
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 231 (2014).
61
RAYMOND LA RAJA, SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
77 (2008); see FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992).
62
LA RAJA, supra note 61, at 77.
63
See id.
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important than they had been in American politics, and far less salient and
important than they would soon become again. Candidates realized they needed
to carve out a personal constituency with their individual campaigning because
they could not rely exclusively on party grassroots mobilization as they once
had. And modern campaigning had shifted during the television age toward
broadcast advertising that was both expensive and aimed at a broad,
heterogeneous audience. Candidates needed to raise money to pay for their own
broadcast advertising and use their advertising to win over persuadable
uncommitted voters in the absence of strong partisanship in the electorate. All
these elements of the American political process, however, began to shift around
the end of the Cold War.
II. THE RISE OF HYPERPARTISANSHIP AFTER THE COLD WAR
Hyperpartisanship reemerged from its Cold War slumber by the 1990s. The
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s triggered a mass realignment of the major
parties that reordered their ideological composition and restored the highly
polarized party politics that reigned for most of American history until the Cold
War era.64 Conservative Democrats, particularly in the South, gradually became
Republicans, while liberal Republicans eventually filtered into the Democratic
Party such that both parties became more ideologically cohesive and
homogeneous than they had been since the nineteenth century.65 As a result, the
percentage of Republicans who described themselves as conservative doubled
from 1978 to 1994, while the percentage of Democrats who said they were
conservative shrank by half over the same period.66
Partisan identification, which had shrunk through the Cold War, began to
rise again around the 1970s onward, with more and more Americans selfidentifying with one of the major parties, particularly so for Americans who
“strongly” identified with a party.67 Conversely, the number of voters
identifying as independent began to decrease from their Cold War percentages.68
With party identification both more common and more tightly aligned with
ideological belief, partisanship by the 1990s became more predictive of voting
64
See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989).
65
See, e.g., id.; LEVENDUSKY, supra note 39, at 147; Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological
Realignment in the U.S. Electorate, 60 J. POL. 634, 638 (1998); Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, John
C. Green, Richard Herrera & Rosalyn Cooperman, Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics,
104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324, 327 (2010).
66
See Abramowitz & Saunders, supra note 65, at 647.
67
See Bafumi & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 4.
68
See id.
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behavior than it had in more than a century. By one measure, partisanship was
77% more predictive of presidential voting in 1996 than it had been in 1972.69
Ticket splitting, quite common during the Cold War, decreased by more than
two-thirds, with voters exercising greater party loyalty to their party across their
ballot and election to election.70 Conversely, straight-ticket voting on a partisan
basis, where voters vote exclusively for their own party’s candidates, increased
dramatically from Cold War levels.71 Republicans became more reliably
conservative and more consistently voted for Republican candidates, and
Democrats more reliably liberal and more consistently voted for Democratic
candidates, than they had been in modern memory.72 The landslide presidential
victories of the Cold War, with a significant percentage of voters crossing party
lines to vote for the other party’s candidates, became unimaginable in the years
since.73
Elected politicians from both parties mirrored the hyperpartisanship of the
electorate.74 Congress, for instance, is more polarized now than it had been since
the nineteenth century.75 The unusual degree of ideological overlap between the
parties in Congress during the Cold War had disappeared by the 1990s.76 By any
of the usual measures, no Democrat in Congress today is as conservative as the
most liberal Republican.77 Just as partisan voters had sharply divided into
ideologically cohesive, fiercely opposed teams, Republican and Democratic
politicians crystalized into rigidly polarized, ideologically unified teams at
nearly all levels of government.78 Not only were the Republicans and Democrats
more ideologically homogeneous, but they each grew even further apart from
the other party at the same time.79 Partisanship, as a result, has not been so
predictive of congressional voting in more than a century.80

69

See Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2000).
See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict Within the
American Electorate, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 219, 221 (2005); Mulligan, supra note 34, at 513–14.
71
See Abramowitz & Webster, supra note 9, at 119, 130–31.
72
See id. at 130.
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
See Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46
POLITY 411, 413 (2014).
76
See Abramowitz & Webster, supra note 9, at 130.
77
See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 45 (2012).
78
See Hare & Poole, supra note 75, at 415–16.
79
See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization
in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83, 87 (2006).
80
See Bartels, supra note 69, at 41–43.
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This hyperpolarized cohesion means that party politicians share in their
party’s fortunes far more than they did in the bipartisan era of the Cold War.81
Internal homogeneity within a party increases agreement on policy aims and
unifies the party’s political agenda.82 Under these conditions, party coordination
and leadership becomes easier, as students of Conditional Party Government
have demonstrated.83 Today’s hyperpolarized parties engage in what Frances
Lee calls partisan “teamsmanship,” where they see the parties’ fortunes as a
zero-sum game and refuse to compromise if it would grant the other side any
sort of political triumph.84 Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell made this
posture explicit when he publicly identified President Barack Obama’s reelection defeat as his party’s “single most-important” goal during Obama’s first
term.85
Not only are today’s parties more unified and polarized than their Cold War
counterparts, they are locked in a perpetual fight for majority control that
intensifies partisan competition.86 Since the end of the Cold War, partisan
control of the U.S. House of Representatives has changed hands four times in a
quarter century.87 The Senate switched party control six times over the same
period, and eight times since 1980.88 The parties now conduct politics with the
sense that every election cycle might swing the legislative majority away from
them, or back into their hands, so partisan politics has become what McConnell
describes as “a whole lot of close races, a massive amount of spending on both
sides . . . a knife fight in an alley.”89

81

See Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, supra note 16, at 1416.
See id. at 1381.
83
See generally John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Consequences of Party Organization in the
House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government, in POLARIZED
POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 2000);
DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POST REFORM HOUSE 31 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991).
84
See FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S.
SENATE 47–73 (2009).
85
Major Garrett, Top GOP Priority: Make Obama a One-Term President, NAT’L J. (Nov. 4, 2010),
https://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/top-gop-priority-make-obama-a-one-term-president20101023/ (“The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term
president.” (quoting Senator McConnell)).
86
Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, supra note 16, at 1440.
87
Charles Apple, Control of House and Senate Since 1990, SPOKESMAN-REV., https://www.spokesman.
com/stories/2020/jun/25/control-house-and-senate-1900/ (last visited May 30, 2021).
88
Id.
89
Carl Hulse, Democrats Hold Edge as Battle for Senate Majority Becomes ‘Knife Fight’, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/us/democrats-senate-majority-election.html (quoting
Senator McConnell).
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By contrast, Cold War politics presented little of this constant fight for
partisan control of Congress or state legislatures.90 Prior to 1980, the Democrats
controlled both the House and Senate for a quarter century, nearly the entire
Cold War period, typically by commanding margins.91 From 1952 to 1982,
Democrats always enjoyed at least a 50% advantage in party self-identification
among American voters.92 It is no surprise then, that Frances Lee’s historical
work demonstrates there was virtually no expectation over that stretch that
Republicans, seen at the time as the permanent congressional minority, could
wrest control away from the Democratic Party.93
For these reasons, today’s Republican and Democratic politicians see their
political interests as bound up with their respective parties’ electoral success as
they never did during the Cold War.94 Party leaders during the Cold War era
tended toward ideological centrism and promoted the party’s overall
electability.95 Under today’s hyperpolarization, increasingly extreme politicians
have ascended to congressional leadership.96 Part of the reason for the
leadership’s ideological extremism is that the party caucuses themselves have
become more extreme and polarized, such that the shift in leadership simply
represents a shift in the party membership’s views.97 That said, another
important reason appears to be that ideologically extreme politicians are more
effective fundraisers, and fundraising has become a particularly important part
of party leadership today.98
Party campaign finance is a primary means for today’s highly cohesive
parties to pool resources and coordinate political action. Politicians once limited
their contributions to the party committees and resisted party requests to pool
resources for the party’s coordinated efforts.99 However, as Robin Kolodny and
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See Apple, supra note 87.
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See LEE, supra note 84, at 24.
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See, e.g., id. at 151.
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See Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, supra note 16, at 1417, 1420.
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Id. at 1381–82.
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See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle & Anthony J. McGann, Congressional Leadership 1965–
96: A New Look at the Extremism Versus Centrality Debate, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 87, 87–88, 93 (2002); Eric
Heberlig, Marc Hetherington & Bruce Larson, The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization
of Congressional Parties, 68 J. POL. 992, 992–93 (2006).
97
Heberlig et al., supra note 96, at 993, 995.
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See id. at 993–94; Bertram Johnson, Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the
Ideologically Extreme, 38 AM. POL. RSCH. 890, 903–06 (2010); Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate
Valence and Ideological Positions in the U.S. House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 381 (2010).
99
See Robin Kolodny & Diana Dwyre, Party-Orchestrated Activities for Legislative Party Goals:
Campaigns for Majorities in the US House of Representatives in the 1990s, 4 PARTY POL. 275, 289 (1998).
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Debra Dwyre report, the Republican takeover of the House in 1994 shocked
congressional politicians into realizing that the congressional majority would be
at stake every election cycle and they needed to invest in their party’s collective
outcomes if they wanted to enjoy majority control.100 The parties subsequently
reorganized party campaign finance to better require, monitor, and incentivize
party politicians to raise and share campaign money with their respective party
caucuses.101 Eric Heberlig and Bruce Larson summarize that “it is now an
expectation that incumbents who desire any influence in the House regularly
make substantial campaign contributions to the party’s congressional campaign
committee and to fellow party candidates.”102 The percentage of congressional
incumbents who contributed from their individual accounts to the party
committees thus has increased from roughly half of the membership in 1992 to
roughly 90% by 2006.103 One result is that campaign finance support for
congressional challengers has increased sharply since 1994, in large part because
of new party support.104
Modern campaign finance is therefore strikingly different than it was at the
time of FECA and the first quarter century of campaign finance law during the
Cold War. Today’s campaign finance is highly coordinated among officeholders
and candidates, official party committees, and other party-affiliated
organizations. The world of campaign finance in 1974, when FECA was
comprehensively amended, was highly candidate-centered without today’s
financial coordination and direction by party organizations.105 As Ray La Raja
has characterized it, FECA’s drafters “designed accountability mechanisms,
such as disclosure and contribution limits, with the focus on candidate
committees” because “[p]arty organizations and political action committees
(PACs) were seen as playing a supportive but circumscribed role in financing
elections.”106 Remember that parties struggled to adjust to the decline of
patronage and the rise of media politics, among other things, at least initially.107
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Id. at 292.
See generally ERIC S. HEBERLIG & BRUCE A. LARSON, CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES, INSTITUTIONAL
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552–53 (2016).
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Campaign finance reformers thus did not focus on party campaign finance in
part because “[t]he concern of many observers in the 1970s, curiously, was that
the Democratic and Republican Parties were too weak.”108
Even so, the major parties were already beginning to pivot under the fresh
realities of FECA. The Republicans had already begun a well-funded strategy of
building up their state organizations through training local operatives, expanding
their donor network, and tightening coordination between the national party and
its state and local counterparts.109 Similar efforts on both Democratic and
Republican sides were helped by the 1979 federal deregulation of so-called “soft
money” fundraising to finance local grass-roots activities, such as voter
registration and turnout operations, and later FEC advisory opinions to permit
soft money fundraising for other joint federal-state campaign activities and issue
advocacy.110 Party investment in campaign fundraising and legal deregulation
of party campaign finance combined by the 1990s to fuel a period of “partycentered” financing in which the national parties dramatically expanded their
fundraising capacities.111 The parties shifted fully from the traditional focus of
the earlier party organizations to what political scientists newly characterized as
“the party in service to the candidate.”112
Critical to our story, growing partisan polarization by the 1990s had
important consequences for party campaign finance. The internal ideological
cohesion of the major parties surged at both the elite and mass levels with the
party realignment that followed the Civil Rights Movement.113 Parties were
more unified ideologically and evolved for the modern campaign finance era.114
Central to this evolution was the cultivation and maintenance of an infrastructure
comprising a dedicated network of wealthy supporters with the financial
108
Glenn Hubbard & Tim Kane, In Defense of Citizens United: Why Campaign Finance Reform Threatens
American Democracy, 92 FOREIGN AFFS. 126, 129 (2013).
109
See Paul S. Herrnson, Party Leadership and Party Organizational Change, in POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND POWER: MODERN PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE LEGACY OF RAY C. BLISS 186, 194–
96, 198 (John C. Green ed., 1994); M. Margaret Conway, Republican Party Nationalization, Campaign
Activities, and Their Implications for the Party System, 13 PUBLIUS 1 (1983); LA RAJA, supra note 61, at 71.
110
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123–24 (2003), see La Raja, supra note 103, at 78; Laura MacCleery,
Goodbye Soft Money, Hello Grassroots: How Campaign Finance Reform Restructured Campaigns and the
Political World, 58 CATH. L. REV. 965, 977 (2009).
111
See Daniel J. Galvin, The Transformation of Political Institutions: Investments in Institutional
Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party Committees, 26 AM. POL. DEV. 50, 57–69 (2012)
(describing explosion of fundraising by political parties).
112
See ALDRICH, supra note 55, at 269.
113
See Gary C. Jacobson, Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection, in
POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 9, 15–16 (Jon R. Bond & Richard
Fleisher eds., 2000).
114
Id. at 22.
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resources and willingness to fund their party.115 This donor class loyally invests
in their respective party, not only by giving to formal party committees but
directly to party candidates and even allied groups involved with party
activity.116
Right about this time and continuing through today, ideological and partisan
polarization among party activists and engaged partisans, which is the category
of citizens most likely to contribute money, grew substantially to mirror
similarly increasing ideological and partisan polarization among politicians
from both parties.117 The major parties during most of the twentieth century were
loosely unified, ideologically muddled, and could be described as “essentially
constituent parties . . . neither structured nor widely perceived as a cohesive
policy link between voters and officials.”118 By contrast, the major parties of this
modern era of campaign finance developed into ideologically cohesive teams,
increasingly unified by shared policy goals and linked by campaign finance,
across officeholders, candidates, and donors at the national, state, and local
levels.
Individual campaign contributors, who today comprise the donor class, are
highly polarized and highly motivated by ideology in their political spending.119
These individual donors tend overwhelmingly to be more ideologically extreme
in their political leanings and favor candidates who are similarly extreme.120
Unlike business groups interested primarily in legislative access to incumbent
115
See PETER L. FRANCIA, JOHN C. GREEN, PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWELL & CLYDE WILCOX,
THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, IDEOLOGUES, AND INTIMATES 18 (2003); Paul S.
Herrnson & Stephanie Perry Curtis, Financing the 2008 Congressional Elections, in FINANCING THE 2008
ELECTION 166, 169–70 (David B. Magelby & Anthony Corrado eds., 2011); MARTY COHEN, DAVID KAROL,
HANS NOEL & JOHN ZALLER, THE PARTY DECIDES: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER REFORM
5–7 (2008); SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL
NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES 43–44 (2009).
116
FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 115, at 19.
117
See Layman et al., supra note 65, at 324; Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a
Myth?, 70 J. POL. 542, 544–48 (2008); Jacobson, supra note 113, at 9; Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C.
Layman, A Dynamic Model of Political Change Among Party Activists, 21 POL. BEHAV. 17, 33 (1999). But see
Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties:
Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972–2008, 20 AM. POL. RSCH. 1, 19–21 (2011)
(conceding that donors are and have become increasingly more ideological, at least since 2002, but contending
that ideological extremism does not necessarily predict campaign finance giving).
118
BURNHAM, supra note 17, at 9.
119
Michael J. Barber, Brandice Canes-Wrone & Sharece Thrower, Ideologically Sophisticated Donors:
Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 271, 285 (2017).
120
See Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interest in the Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 301–08
(2013); Barber et al., supra note 119, at 285; Joseph Bafumi & Michael Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519 (2010);
Stone & Simas, supra note 98.
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officeholders from both parties, wealthy individuals are instead motivated
primarily by their ideological preferences, care little about incumbency, and tend
to donate exclusively to candidates from one party.121 Indeed, individual donors
who give exclusively to one party dominate campaign finance and contributed
roughly 85% of federal campaign finance money for the 2016 and 2020 election
cycles.122 Just 1% of federal campaign finance money came from individual
contributors who split their donations more or less evenly between the major
parties.123 As a result, studies find that ideological polarization increases when
legal limits on individual contributions at the state level are higher or not
imposed at all.124 Where there are higher limits, or none at all, individual
contributors channel more money overwhelmingly to only one party, and
disproportionately to the most ideologically extreme candidates of that party.125
Party contributors, like party voters, cleanly sort into more ideologically
homogeneous coalitions in support of more polarized and extreme candidates.126
Because individual donors are ideologically polarized and ideologically
motivated, the more ideologically extreme the candidate is, the more he or she
tends to draw in individual contributions.127 More conservative Republicans
draw more money on average than less extreme Republicans, while more liberal
Democrats draw more money than less extreme Democrats.128 Along the same
lines, a related dynamic has emerged for party leadership. Historically, party
leadership tended to rise from ideological moderates within their parties who
could mediate a centrist position among and between various ideological
interests inside the party coalition.129 More recently, however, party leadership
has increasingly come from the ideological extremes of their parties.130
121
See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 POL. RSCH.
Q. 148, 152–56 (2016).
122
See Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/donordemographics?cycle=2016&display=A (last visited May 30, 2021) (reporting FEC figures for individual
contributions of $200 or more during the 2015–16 and 2019–20 cycles).
123
See id. (reporting the FEC total for “double givers” who gave at least a third of their contributed money
to each party).
124
See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 106 (2015).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 114.
127
See Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE
221, 229 (2009).
128
See id.
129
See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL
PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATION PROCESS 47–55 (1991).
130
See Heberlig et al., supra note 96, at 996 (“The conclusion is unmistakable; extremists are significantly
more likely to win leadership elections today than in the 1980s and early 1990s.”); Stephanie Stamm, Paul Ryan
Would Be the Most Conservative House Speaker in Recent History, NAT’L J. (Oct. 22, 2015),
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Campaign finance again plays an important role. Leadership hopefuls since the
1990s have advanced their leadership prospects through their superior
fundraising capacities.131 Party leadership is expected and, in fact, more likely
to contribute money to party committees out of their own campaign accounts
and to broker contributions to the party from their personal donor network.132
Ideologically extreme officeholders enjoy greater capacity to raise contributions
from individual donors because individual donors favor more ideologically
extreme candidates.133 As a result, ideologically extreme officeholders with
leadership ambitions can leverage their fundraising advantages to rise in the
party hierarchy by raising more money for party committees and fellow party
candidates.134
The major parties now market themselves as tight-knit, cohesive teams
whose ideological consistency among their candidates and officeholders nicely
matches the ideological cohesion and motivations of their campaign finance
donors. To be sure, campaign finance donors are an important part of the party
coalition, well-aligned with their parties’ respective ideological agendas and
invested in their missions. The major parties connect donors with their
candidates across the country to advance their agendas irrespective of district
lines and state borders.135 Since 1980, the average share of a congressional
candidate’s total fundraising that comes from individual donors has grown from
less than half to nearly three-quarters of total fundraising.136 Furthermore,
candidate fundraising has increasingly drawn on contributors who live outside

https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/91166/paul-ryan-would-be-most-conservative-house-speaker-recent-history
(reporting that House Speakers have been progressively more polarized by DW-NOMINATE score since 1994,
peaking for the moment with Paul Ryan ranking as the most conservative Speaker across at least the last 40
Congresses).
131
See Eric S. Heberlig, Bruce A. Larson, Daniel A. Smith & Kristen L. Soltis, Look Who’s Coming to
Dinner: Direct Versus Brokered Member Campaign Contributions to the NRCC, 36 AM. POL. RSCH. 433, 433–
34 (2008).
132
See id. at 444–46.
133
See Heberlig et al., supra note 96, at 1002–03.
134
See id. at 1001–03; Eric S. Heberlig & Bruce A. Larson, Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House
Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 597 (2005); Christopher J.
Deering & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Determinants of House Committee Chair Selection, 34 AM. POL. RSCH. 1, 9 (2006);
Eric S. Heberlig & Bruce A. Larson, Congressional Parties and the Mobilization of Leadership PAC
Contributions, 16 PARTY POL. 451, 454 (2010) (“Generous givers are rewarded with prestigious committee
assignments, committee leadership positions, extended leadership positions and, in the majority party, with
greater floor access for their legislation.” (citations omitted)).
135
See James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check Is in the Mail:
Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 392 (2008) (“Donations from
nonresident individuals flowing into competitive districts are steered there, directly and indirectly, by parties
ultimately seeking to maintain or take control of Congress.”).
136
See Barber & McCarty, supra note 21, at 37, 57.
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the candidate’s district, presumably relying on party and ideological networks
for support over the same time period.137 Party donors want to “contribute their
money in close contests in order to maximize the number of legislators who
support their political positions.”138 Candidates and contributors operate now
more than ever as an integrated nationwide network that connects likeminded
campaign finance recipients and donors.
III. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AND MODERN
HYPERPARTISANSHIP
This Part explains the mismatch between Cold War campaign finance law
and today’s modern campaign finance practice. Campaign finance law, inherited
from the Cold War, focuses on individual candidates and generally overlooks
the sophisticated role of major parties in coordinating the sprawling,
interconnected coalition of party actors in modern campaign finance. Campaign
finance law today, as a result, underestimates the corruption risk that parties may
present in collectivizing the potential for quid pro quo, while it also
overestimates the First Amendment interests in deregulated campaign finance as
the parties focus increasingly on consolidating their bases rather than traditional
persuasion.
A.

What Has Changed in Campaign Finance?

The campaign finance jurisprudence has been slow to keep up with the rise
of hyperpartisanship following the Cold War’s end. As hyperpartisanship
developed, the major parties regained their position at the center of national
politics and national campaign finance. Parties comprise critical networks that
connect donors, candidates, affiliated organizations, and officeholders and direct
money where it will most help the parties’ coordinated efforts. However,
campaign finance law developed to regulate largely dyadic relationships
between individual donors and candidates as the focus, while largely
overlooking the central role that parties now have carved out.
In an important early misstep during the 1990s, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional FECA limits on independent expenditures by political parties
in connection with a general election campaign for congressional office.139
FECA had limited party independent expenditures, notwithstanding a general

137
138
139

See id. (citations omitted).
FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 115, at 51.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 604 (1996).
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prohibition on expenditure limits under Buckley, because parties are so
intertwined with their candidates that party expenditures were deemed as
coordinated with their candidates as a matter of law.140 Even in the absence of
any formal coordination between party and candidate regarding the timing or
content of party expenditures on the candidate’s behalf, party expenditures were
nonetheless subject to restriction and limited to certain FEC state-specific
caps.141 Put simply, parties were understood to be alliances of interconnected
activists, donors, and candidates dedicated to electing party candidates and
therefore could hardly be expected to act truly independently from their
candidates in their shared mission of winning elections. What’s more, in the case
of formal party committees, candidates and officeholders are almost always
directly involved in the fundraising and spending of their campaign finance
money. Candidates were not simply entwined with their parties; in the case of
party committee campaign finance, candidates quite literally were the party in
almost every case.142
Nevertheless, instead of identifying parties as the central hub of campaign
finance for both candidates and donors, the Court explained it was not aware of
any special worries about coordination with parties that were not addressed by
the requisite “absence of prearrangement and coordination” applicable to any
political committee.143 The Court seemed blind to the obvious and pervasive role
that party committees and officials played in coordinating party campaign
finance throughout the party network of candidates and donors. Campaign
finance expenditures by political parties thus could be treated legally as no
different than those by independent interest groups without any formal
connections to candidates and officeholders. This, despite the fact that “[t]he
candidate is typically a member of the party, has been active in the party, and,
once nominated, bears the party label, uses the party’s place on the ballot, and
necessarily benefits from the loyalty and support of party activists.”144 As the
Court explained it, it could not see how it could treat parties differently from
“ordinary political committees.”145

140

See id. at 619.
See id. at 621.
142
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 107, at 565 n.155 (reporting that roughly half the membership of the
Republican and Democratic National Committees at the time were current or former candidates for office).
143
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 616 (quotation marks omitted).
144
Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 639
(2000).
145
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 618.
141
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Admittedly, the Rehnquist Court briefly recognized the risk of campaign
finance corruption through the modern political party. The 1990s featured an
explosion in soft money fundraising to the point that the major parties together
raised almost half a billion dollars in soft money in 2000 and in 2002, accounting
for roughly half of national Democratic Party fundraising and one-third of
national Republican fundraising.146 Congress responded by enacting the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which in part prohibited the
receipt of soft money by the national party committees.147 In McConnell v. FEC,
the Court upheld the prohibition and acknowledged that the “close connection
and alignment of interests” between the national parties and their federal
officeholders raised concerns about “actual or apparent indebtedness” by
officeholders in return for soft money contributions to the parties.148 Even if the
parties themselves could not formally wield government authority or directly
offer quid pro quo favors to soft money donors, the parties’ “special relationship
and unity of interest” with their officeholders created the risk that their
officeholders would do so in their stead.149 The upshot for campaign finance law
should have been that earlier assumptions about the major parties’ independence
from candidates and freestanding constitutional First Amendment rights appear
far less persuasive today than they did before hyperpolarization began taking
root.
But recognition of the central role of the major parties in today’s
hyperpolarized campaign finance was quickly left behind by the Roberts Court.
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down the longstanding aggregate cap
on total contributions by a single individual for a given federal election cycle.150
Shaun McCutcheon, the plaintiff in the case, had contributed to sixteen
Republican candidates, all three national Republican Party committees, and
several conservative PACs for the 2011–12 election cycle, but he was prevented
from contributing to even more candidates because his contribution total for the
cycle had already reached the $117,000 aggregate cap.151 In striking down the
aggregate cap, the Court reasoned that there was no particular quid pro quo risk
from someone like Shaun McCutcheon giving a contribution to more candidates
than the aggregate limit had allowed. If McCutcheon was permitted to give a
146
See Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the 2000 Elections: The Federal Role of Soft Money Financing,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1025, 1035 (2002).
147
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
148
McConnell v. FEC, 540 US. 93, 155 (2003).
149
Id. at 145.
150
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014).
151
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.D.C. 2012).
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four-figure amount to sixteen candidates in a cycle, the Court puzzled why he
could be constitutionally limited from giving the same amount to a seventeenth
candidate, or an eighteenth, and so on.152 Absent a demonstrable risk that money
channels back from the new recipients, the Court could not see why the
candidates who already received money from McCutcheon would care whether
he gave to additional candidates beyond themselves. The Court concluded the
aggregate cap therefore did not further any quid pro quo corruption risk and
struck it down as unconstitutional.153
Of course, officeholders and candidates who receive campaign donations
care quite a bit whether their party committees, allied officeholders, and fellow
candidates receive campaign contributions from major donors. Today’s parties
are ideologically cohesive networks that connect likeminded officeholders and
candidates with each other and with generous, committed donors willing to
spread their money throughout party networks to advance their shared goals.
Officeholders and candidates care most about their own campaign accounts, but
at the same time, they see obvious value in seeing major donors like
McCutcheon contributing beyond their own campaigns to their party committees
and fellow party candidates.
For this very reason, officeholders and candidates invest heavily in party
fundraising and organization, and increasingly so in today’s hyperpolarized
environment when party actors appear more tightly linked than an era ago. Major
donors like McCutcheon are a crucial part of their party networks. Today’s
parties are increasingly “money-centered, technical” operations that exist to
serve candidates and subsist on a reliable base of committed activists like
McCutcheon who identify with one party and bankroll its costs.154 In this
context, it is easy to imagine why candidates care whether a major donor
contributes not just to them but to their party and fellow party candidates, all of
whom are aligned closely in common cause. The McCutcheon Court could not
see, or declined to acknowledge, how party actors are tightly linked together
through party campaign finance in today’s hyperpolarized politics. And
encouraged by the Court’s myopia toward parties, regulation of party campaign
finance has only further loosened since McCutcheon.155

152

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 227.
154
See Daniel M. Shea, The Passing of Realignment and the Advent of the “Base-less” Party System, 27
AM. POL. Q. 33, 48 (1999).
155
See, e.g., Carrie Levine, Murky Rules Boost Political Parties’ Rich Donor ‘Slush Funds’, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2015, 5:01 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/murky-rules-boost-political-parties-richdonor-slush-funds-n401736; Matea Gold, FEC Says Convention Donations Will Not Count Against Cap on
153
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B. The First Amendment Consequences of Hyperpartisanship
One result of campaign finance in today’s hyperpolarized politics is that the
parties and their officeholders increasingly reflect the policy preferences of the
wealthy. A growing body of political science literature overwhelmingly
demonstrates how and why the preferences of the wealthy are massively
overrepresented as hyperpolarization and campaign finance spending have
grown since the 1960s and 1970s.156 Studies of congressional voting consistently
find that the policy preferences of poor and middle-class citizens exert little to
no influence on the roll call voting of Senators and Representatives, while the
preferences of wealthy citizens are disproportionately reflected in both roll-call
votes and actual legislative outcomes.157 Other studies confirm that same pattern
occurs at the state level across a range of policy issues.158 More tellingly, work
by Adam Bonica, Joseph Bafumi, and Michael Herron strongly suggests
campaign finance-based explanations for the disproportionate influence of the
wealthy.159 Ideal point distributions for campaign finance donors and members
of Congress are similarly bimodal, clustering in liberal and conservative peaks,
in sharp contrast from the central, single-peaked normal distribution of the
general public.160 Furthermore, Senators from both parties deviate dramatically

Party Contributions, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fec-saysconvention-donations-will-not-count-against-cap-on-party-contributions/2014/10/09/d4642d96-4fe1-11e48c24-487e92bc997b_story.html; James Anderson, Court: Colorado GOP’s Creation of Super PAC Was Legal,
GAZETTE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://gazette.com/government/court-colorado-gops-creation-of-super-pac-waslegal/article_c646641d-96f3-54d7-8c8d-43e62a588b16.html.
156
See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1468–79 (2015) (summarizing the literature).
157
See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE
253–62 (2008); MARIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER
IN AMERICA 80 (2012); Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation, 75 J. POL.
773, 783–85 (2013); Chris Tausanovitch, Income, Ideology, and Representation, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J.
SOC. SCI. 33, 49 (2016); Christopher Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income,
Resources, and Policy Representation in the 110th House, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 938, 948 (2012) [hereinafter Ellis,
Understanding Economic Biases].
158
Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL.
RSCH. 29, 44, 46 (2011); Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy?: Policy
Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED 189,
217 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
159
See generally Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and
Their Directors and Executives, 18 BUS. & POL. 367, 392 (2016) (showing how corporate elites have an outsized
influence on ideological position of political candidates); Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace,
58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367 (2014) (demonstrating a high degree of ideological cohesion among professionals from
high-paying industries); Bafumi & Herron, supra note 120 (positing campaign finance as one explanation for
increasing ideological extremism among U.S. legislators).
160
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 120, at 536–37; Bonica, supra note 159, at 379–80.
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from the median voter from their respective state but match “nearly
perfect[ly]”161 the preferences of campaign finance donors from their party.162
In this sense, far more so than for other areas of election law, modern
campaign finance is both a manifestation of hyperpolarized partisanship as well
as one of its likely contributing causes.163As I have argued, hyperpolarization
has tightened the bonds among partisan actors and increased the efficiencies and
payoffs from campaign finance cooperation.164 It is a basic tenet from the logic
of collective action that greater internal homogeneity brings important
advantages for greater in-group coordination and organization.165 As party
officeholders, candidates, and activists have become more homogeneous and
ideologically polarized, the incentives increase to cooperate and pool
resources.166 The parties increasingly could offer a more ideologically extreme
and consistent product, in the form of a more ideologically unified set of
leadership, officeholders, and other candidates, to attract financial sponsorship
from more ideologically well-sorted and motivated wealthy donors.167
The surge in hyperpolarization coincided with a judicial deregulation of
campaign finance. Wealthy donors, with extreme ideological preferences, have
enjoyed growing opportunities to invest incredible amounts of money into
politics at the same time that hyperpolarization has manifested.168 Soft money
donations were just the beginning in the 1990s, such that even after BCRA cut
off soft money, it was quickly replaced, first by unlimited donations to
nonconnected Section 527 committees, and then after Citizens United, by
161
Michael J. Barber, Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the US Senate,
80 PUB. OP. Q. 225, 238 (2016).
162
Id.; see also Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases, supra note 157, at 945 (showing ideological
cohesion between campaign finance donors and their political party). Even conservative intellectuals may feel
similar pressure to conform to the preferences of funders. See Sam Tanenhaus, On the Front Lines of the GOP’s
Civil War, ESQUIRE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a14428464/gop-never-trump//
(quoting conservatives who describe conservative thought as “tightly leashed by wealthy donors” and worry that
donors will cut off conservative dissenters); Max Kutner, Will Bannon’s Split from Trump, Breitbart and the
Mercers Ignite a GOP Civil War?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 10, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/stevebannon-breitbart-mercer-fire-fury-michael-wolff-776408 (describing Steve Bannon’s ouster and defunding by
the Mercer family after his apostasy).
163
Barber, supra note 161, at 244.
164
Kang, supra note 107, at 560–61.
165
See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 5–65 (1971) (articulating the classic logic of collective action); ROHDE, supra note 83, at 167–68
(demonstrating how party homogeneity facilitated reforms in party organization during the 1970s); William R.
Lowry & Charles R. Shipan, Party Differentiation in Congress, 27 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 33, 43 (2002) (finding
legislative cohesion increases with homogeneity among voters).
166
Kang, supra note 107, at 550–51.
167
Id. at 601.
168
Id. at 602.
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unlimited donations to Super PACs and Section 501(c) organizations.169
Individual donors today possess more capacity to spend on electioneering than
they have during the modern campaign finance era since FECA.170 As a
consequence, hyperpolarization has encouraged investment and cooperation in
campaign finance through party networks, but the growing importance of
campaign finance has likewise handed greater and greater influence over the
parties and party officeholders to wealthy ideological donors.171 Wealthy
ideologues now push the parties, officeholders, and candidates further toward
the ideological, hyperpolarized extremes and exercise more capacity to do so
through campaign finance than they ever have under modern campaign finance
law.172
The resulting representational misalignment between officeholders and the
public has normative, perhaps even constitutional salience.173 Campaign finance
law developed meaningfully first in the 1970s when parties played such a limited
role in campaign finance that party committees were almost classified, until a
last-minute intervention, as nothing more than any other generic political
committee with the same contribution limits as non-party entities. However, as
parties assumed heavier campaign finance responsibilities and became
dramatically more hyperpolarized in the process, they thoroughly outgrew the
modest role in campaign finance originally imagined for them in the prior era.174
Like election law in other areas, today’s campaign finance law no longer fits the
role courts suppose that the parties and party relationships play in modern
campaign finance.175 One consequence is that courts should recognize a
government interest in preventing aggregate corruption where party linkages tie
together the interests of candidates in campaign finance beyond the usual quid
pro quo framework that the Court originally conceived in Buckley v. Valeo in
1976.176 And if there ever is a cognizable interest in redressing representational
misalignment through campaign finance law,177 it is rooted in the hyperpolarized

169
See generally Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1914–19
(2013) (describing this evolution).
170
See generally Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(reviewing the transformation of campaign finance law under the Roberts Court).
171
See Kang, supra note 107, at 599–606.
172
Id. at 602.
173
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 156, at 1441–42, 1444; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and
Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 321 (2014) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment].
174
Kang, supra note 107, at 553.
175
See Briffault, supra note 144, at 620.
176
See Kang, supra note 107.
177
See Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note 173.
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nature of modern campaign finance and stronger today than it has been for
perhaps a century.
An irony of hyperpolarization is that campaign finance serves traditional
First Amendment interests, in enhancing “the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office,” perhaps less ever since FECA’s
passage.178 Campaign finance law, as the Supreme Court has developed it,
invests First Amendment importance in campaign spending and ultimately
entrusts the electorate with “the responsibility for judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments.”179 The Court has applied strict scrutiny
to restrictions on campaign spending as a result, in the interest of entrusting final
judgment of public debates with the voters, cognizant that “if there be any danger
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced . . . it
is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.”180
This paradigmatic framework was particularly well-suited to the Cold War
Era’s focus on undecided voters in elections. It nicely fit the First Amendment
understanding of campaign discourse as a competition between Republicans and
Democrats to persuade voters to their side through a robust public debate.181
Restrictions, under this understanding, would only reduce information for voters
to make their ultimate decisions and were heavily disfavored under strict
scrutiny.182 By contrast, disclosure requirements were useful because they
“allow[] voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely
than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign
speeches.”183 In a bipartisan era when the parties were more difficult to
distinguish, and voters more focused on candidates than parties, campaign
finance law sensibly aimed at increasing the free flow of persuasive campaign
speech.184 After all, classic First Amendment-style, candidate-specific
persuasion did appear to be the parties’ and candidates’ aims.185 Voters were
more ambivalent, later to make up their mind, and more likely to switch party
allegiance in a given election than typical partisans.186 Cross-pressured voters of
the era held “opinions or views simultaneously supporting different sides” of an
178

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam).
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
180
Id. at 792.
181
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
182
Id. at 19.
183
Id. at 67.
184
Ryan Lizza, The Final Push: The Obama Team’s High-Risk Strategy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 22, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/29/the-final-push.
185
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 39, at 9.
186
See BERELSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 52–72; LAZARSFELD ET AL., supra note 41, at 19–33.
179

KANG_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 11:37 AM

HYPERPARTISAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

1201

election,187 such that some factors “may influence [them] toward the
Republicans while others may operate in favor of the Democrats.”188 As one
political scientist summarizes, “For fifty years, political scientists—and political
pundits—argued that campaigns should focus on identifying and converting
undecided voters: the ‘swing’ voters.”189
By contrast, hyperpolarization has meant that the electorate has predictably
trended toward rigid partisan and ideological polarization. Marc Hetherington
explains that “[g]reater ideological polarization in Congress has clarified public
perceptions of party ideology, which has produced a more partisan
electorate.”190 Voters have a clearer sense of both parties’ agendas and positions
and have increasingly aligned themselves with one party. In short, there are
fewer voters who cannot distinguish clearly between the major parties,191 and
fewer voters undecided between them.192 What’s more, partisan voters more
reliably vote in favor of their chosen party’s candidates than they have in the
past.193 As another political scientist summarized, “With a larger base, the
marginal return on mobilizing the committed increases relative to the return on
converting swing voters.”194 It is simply logical for campaigns to focus more on
mobilizing their base and less on persuading undecided voters as the former
group increases and the latter group decreases in size.

187

BERELSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 19.
LAZARSFELD ET AL., supra note 41, at 53.
189
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 39, at 9; Lizza, supra note 184 (“For decades, persuasion was considered the
key to winning, and the gurus and the consultants promised candidates that they could craft messages to win
over uncommitted voters.”).
190
Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 619, 629 (2001).
191
See generally BRUCE E. KEITH, CANDACE J. NELSON, MARK C. WESTLYE & RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER,
THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER (1992) (demonstrating that voters have trouble distinguishing the major
parties and weakly partisan positions); Judd R. Thornton, The Impact of Elite Polarization on Partisan
Ambivalence and Indifference, 35 POL. BEHAV. 409 (2013) (showing that independents are indifferent to political
and elite polarization).
192
See generally Bartels, supra note 69 (showing increasingly partisan voting pattern); Hetherington,
supra note 190, at 620 (same); Brewer, supra note 70, at 220–21 (same); Bafumi & Shapiro, supra note 34
(same).
193
See, e.g., Matthew S. Levendusky, Jeremy C. Pope & Simon D. Jackman, Measuring District-Level
Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of U.S. Elections, 70 J. POL. 736, 750 (2008) (validating
increasingly reliable partisan voting patterns); Bartels, supra note 69, at 44 (same); Bafumi & Shapiro, supra
note 34, at 1 (same); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization
and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOCIO. 408, 414 (2008) (“[P]artisan loyalties have started
to count more, to the point that, in the middle of the 1990s, their impact on voting behavior reached its highest
level in at least 50 years.”); Corwin D. Smidt, Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating Voter, 61
AM. J. POL. SCI. 365, 379 (2017) (“Americans now exhibit the highest observed rates of party allegiance when
voting across successive presidential elections.”).
194
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 39, at 9.
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Mass hyperpolarization also has made voter persuasion more difficult even
when campaigns make the effort to sway whatever undecided and persuadable
voters remain out there. Realignment of liberal and conservative voters has
sorted liberals into a liberal Democratic Party and conservatives into a
conservative Republican Party.195 The Pew Research Center estimates that just
7% of the entire electorate could be characterized as a persuadable
independent.196 Not only are there fewer mismatched and therefore “crosspressured” voters susceptible to campaign persuasion, but partisan voters today
are more entrenched in their party-consensus views across a broader range of
issues.197 Even independent voters display greater ideological consistency today
and more fixed orientations toward the major parties.198 Campaign finance thus
purchases less persuasive advocacy today than it did during the Cold War
because there are not as many persuadable voters out there to receive it.
As a result, persuasive appeals to undecided voters are less effective under
current conditions of hyperpolarization. Campaigning simply encourages
hyperpolarized voters to resist contrary advocacy and to retreat to their partisan
sides. When partisanship is activated, as it always is during election
campaigning,199 political scientists find in experimental and survey analyses that
partisan voters actually double down on their partisanship.200 Rather than
challenge their partisan predispositions, partisan voters facing cross-pressures
instead engage in motivated reasoning, ignore strength of substantive argument,
and express greater loyalty to their original partisan position.201

195
See Matthew S. Levendusky, The Microfoundations of Mass Polarization, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 162, 174
(2009); Matthew S. Levendusky, Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization, 32 POL.
BEHAV. 111, 117 (2010) [hereinafter Levendusky, Clearer Cues].
196
See Julia Manchester, Partisan Divisions Sharpen as Independent Voters Fade, HILL (Sept. 17, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/461669-partisan-divisions-sharpen-as-independent-votersfade; see also Aaron Blake, A Record Number of Americans Claim to Be Independent. They Are Kidding
Themselves., WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/01/
08/a-record-number-of-americans-claim-to-be-independent-they-are-kidding-themselves/.
197
See, e.g., Baldassari & Gelman, supra note 193, at 440 (“[T]he relation between people’s political
attitudes and their party identification of political ideology has tightened.”); Andrew Garner & Harvey Palmer,
Polarization and Issue Consistency over Time, 33 POL. BEHAV. 225, 226 (2011); Levendusky, Clearer Cues,
supra note 195, at 117; Layman et al., supra note 65.
198
See Smidt, supra note 193, at 379.
199
See Gary C. Jacobson, How Do Campaigns Matter?, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 31, 40 (2015) (explaining
that campaigns prime partisans and that presidential elections in particular are polarizing events).
200
See James N. Druckman, Erik Peterson & Rune Slothuus, How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects
Public Opinion Formation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 68 (2013); Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber & Ebonya
Washington, Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
720, 742 (2010); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political
Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 808, 819 (2003); Levendusky, Clearer Cues, supra note 195, at 117.
201
See, e.g., Druckman et al., supra note 200, at 68; Benjamin E. Lauderdale, Partisan Disagreements

KANG_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 11:37 AM

HYPERPARTISAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

1203

Hyperpolarization therefore complicates traditional campaign efforts to expand
one’s partisan base by persuading cross-pressured voters.
In response to hyperpolarization, modern campaigns have shifted their
traditional focus toward turnout rather than persuasion. As Costas Panagopoulos
observes, “campaigns are devoting growing attention to mobilizing devoted
partisans rather than to convincing ‘swing’ or otherwise persuadable voters.”202
He found that the parties contacted strong partisan and independent voters at
roughly the same rate from 1956 to 1996, reflecting equal interest in wooing
uncommitted voters and in mobilizing their partisan base.203 Since then, the
parties have placed growing emphasis on base mobilization such that the major
parties have increased their contact rate for strong partisans at twice the rate for
independents.204 In the process, the parties and their campaigns are
implementing insights from empirical studies that established campaign
spending is best used to boost partisan turnout rather than persuade swing voters.
By the 2000s, political science had demonstrated conclusively that traditional
campaign efforts to influence most voters’ preferences over candidates were
basically ineffective.205 By contrast, however, political science revealed that
campaign efforts to stimulate voter turnout among sympathetic voters had
comparatively large effects, particularly when done through face-to-face
contact.206

Arising from Rationalization of Common Information, 4 POL. SCI. RSCH. & METHODS 477, 490 (2016).
202
Costas Panagopoulos, All About That Base: Changing Campaign Strategies in U.S. Presidential
Elections, 22 PARTY POL. 179, 180 (2016); see also Lizza, supra note 184 (“[A]s the electorate has become
increasingly polarized, campaign tacticians have become [focused] more on getting their own voters to the polls
than on persuading others to change their allegiance.”).
203
Panagopoulos, supra note 202, at 183–84.
204
See id.; see also Ryan D. Enos & Anthony Fowler, Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale Campaigns on
Voter Turnout, 6 POL. SCI. RSCH. & METHODS 733, 747–48 (2016) (finding statistical impact of new emphasis
on base mobilization in the increasing turnout differential between battleground and non-battleground states
beginning in 2000).
205
See generally Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign
Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 148 (2018)
(estimating the persuasive effects of campaign contact and advertising in general elections as “zero”); Alan S.
Gerber, James G. Gimpel, Donald P. Green & Daron R. Shaw, How Large and Long-Lasting Are the Persuasive
Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135
(2011) (finding an advertisement’s effects to “have all but disappeared” after a week or two). But see Michael
M. Franz & Travis Ridout, Does Political Advertising Persuade?, 29 POL. BEHAV. 465, 475 (2007)
(demonstrating that political advertisements persuade); James N. Druckman, Priming the Vote: Campaign
Effects in a U.S. Senate Election, 25 POL. PSYCH. 577, 591–92 (2004) (same).
206
Druckman, supra note 205, at 591; Enos & Fowler, supra note 204, at 735, 743–44; Alan S. Gerber &
Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field
Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653, 661 (2000).
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New advances in computing and voter data, along with new willingness to
implement social scientific approaches, produced unprecedented sophistication
in outreach to boost turnout among friendly voters.207 The parties and their
campaigns were suddenly able to micro-target specific voters, identified for their
favorable demographics and observable behavior, as potential in-party voters
and tailor face-to-face or Internet outreach specifically to encourage them to
vote.208 No longer were campaigns limited to mass advertising, mainly through
network television, with the same message received by committed partisans,
undecided independents, and out-party voters alike.209 This shifting campaign
focus toward base mobilization was both inspired by hyperpolarization and by
helping to “creat[e] an electorate comprised increasingly of committed partisans
and ideologues.”210 Campaign finance thus preaches to the converted more than
it did during the Cold War and arguably serves First Amendment interests less,
or at least far differently, today than it did during the Cold War.211 More recent
shifts to campaign spending on social media, rather than broadcast advertising,
have accelerated all these trends even further.212
In sum, the limited Cold War conception of corruption in campaign finance
has become outdated by today’s party politics, and the countervailing case
against regulation based on the First Amendment interests served by campaign
finance has become correspondingly weaker. For these reasons, the Cold War
constitutional framework for campaign finance law no longer captures the
constitutional stakes surrounding today’s hyperpolarized campaign finance and
party politics.
That said, if the constitutional case for campaign finance regulation is
stronger today under hyperpolarization than it was during the Cold War Era,
there is at least one Cold War rationale for regulation that does seem weaker
207
See generally SASHA ISSENBERG, THE VICTORY LAB: THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING CAMPAIGNS
(2013) (showing how technology and data are used to maximize voter turnout); David W. Nickerson & Todd
Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSPS. 51, 70 (2014) (same).
208
See HILLYGUS & SHIELDS, supra note 42, at 160 (quoting a political consultant explaining that “[y]ou
don’t have to shotgun anymore. You can now bullet.”); Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 207, at 58
(“[C]ampaigns are able to predict with greater accuracy which citizens will support their candidates and issues
better than which citizens will oppose their candidates or issues.”).
209
See Vincent Raynauld & André Turcotte, “Different Strokes for Different Folks”: Implications of Voter
Micro-Targeting and Appeal in the Age of Donald Trump, in POLITICAL MARKETING IN THE 2016 U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 11, 15–16 (Jamie Gillies ed., 2018).
210
Panagopoulos, supra note 202, at 188.
211
Briffault, supra note 144, at 626–27.
212
See Kate Gibson, Spending on U.S. Digital Political Ads to Top $1 Billion for First Time, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 12, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spending-on-us-digital-political-ads-to-cross-1-billion-forfirst-time/.
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today.213 In the 1990 case Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court
upheld a state ban on independent expenditures by corporations based on what
has been described as an anti-distortion interest in campaign finance
regulation.214 The anti-distortion interest targets the prevention of a “different
type of corruption in the political arena” than the usual quid pro quo conception
articulated in Buckley.215 Instead, this anti-distortion interest, as the Court
explained in Austin, allowed the government to offset “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” through the corporate
form and therefore “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”216 The Court agreed the government had a
legitimate concern about “the threat that huge corporate treasuries . . . will be
used to influence unfairly the outcome of elections.”217 Austin was overruled
twenty years later by Citizens United,218 but its anti-distortion rationale remains
a touchstone in campaign finance law for reformers who worry that the “wealthy
and powerful” may be able to “exert an undue influence” on election results by
“drown[ing] out other points of view.”219
Although there is more than one plausible construction of Austin’s antidistortion rationale,220 I focus on anti-distortion as primarily aimed at protecting
the integrity of election outcomes. From this perspective, a government interest
in anti-distortion targets the potential translation of corporate spending
advantages into unfair influence over voters and thus ultimately into election
outcomes skewed toward corporate preferences.221 This concern, that corporate
wealth will successfully “fund communications to convince voters to select
certain candidates over others,” is a common worry in campaign finance.222 As
Dan Ortiz famously framed the concern, it presupposes disengaged voters—socalled “civic slackers”—decide how to vote by responding to campaign
advertising without deeper reflection about their interests and civic
responsibility, and therefore will be particularly susceptible to asymmetric

213

Thanks to Nick Stephanopoulos for his help with this insight on an earlier version of this project.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
215
Id.
216
Id. at 660.
217
Id. at 669.
218
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
219
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
220
See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 111–14 (2003) (arguing that Austin’s anti-distortion rationale simply
repackaged equality rationales for campaign finance regulation).
221
See Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note 173, at 1460.
222
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214
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spending that corporations would threaten to pour into elections.223 However
salient this worry is in the abstract, the rise of hyperpolarization actually makes
these anti-distortion concerns less credible today than they have been since
Buckley. The reason is that hyperpolarization has incentivized the major parties
and their candidates to be less focused on persuading so-called undecided voters,
Ortiz’s civic slackers, than they have been in decades.224
Against this background, it is harder to sustain an argument that campaign
finance regulation is necessary for anti-distortion purposes. Campaign finance
spending is increasingly used to mobilize nonvoters to vote precisely because
they are likely to vote according to their predictably partisan preferences.225 In
this sense, campaign spending in today’s hyperpolarized politics appear less
likely to produce election results that “have little or no correlation to the public’s
support.”226 The spending of the major parties is directed not at persuading
voters against their likely preferences or interests and thereby distorting election
outcomes, but instead is directed at activating likely partisans simply to turn out
and vote according to their interests and preexisting predispositions. Voting by
newly activated citizens along these lines cannot be indicted as the voting by
“careless way” that Dan Ortiz cautions against in his exposition on civic slackers
and campaign finance law.227 Their votes are targeted for partisan mobilization
and likely to be responsive to mobilization outreach, because they do not require
persuasion and instead predictably mirror voting patterns by similarly situated
citizens who reliably vote along partisan lines.228 They quietly possess partisan
leanings in the first place and already were predisposed to vote as the parties
prevail on them to do. Campaign spending by the major parties arguably makes
election results more democratically representative, in this particular respect, by
underwriting participation and shaping the electorate to more closely match the
overall population. As the parties redirect campaign finance toward partisan

223
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 902–
04 (1998).
224
David Freedlander, An Unsettling New Theory: There Is No Swing Voter, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2020, 5:09
AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/02/06/rachel-bitecofer-profile-election-forecasting-newtheory-108944 (quoting political scientist Rachel Bitecofer’s assesment that, “[i]n the polarized era, the outcome
isn’t really about the candidates. What matters is what percentage of the electorate is Republican and Republican
leaners, and what percentage is Democratic and Democratic leaners, and how they get activated”).
225
See id.
226
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
227
Ortiz, supra note 223, at 913. That said, partisan mobilization of previous inactive voters still may not
fulfill the deliberative ideals Ortiz sets forth as democratically normative. Id. at 901–05.
228
See ISSENBERG, supra note 207, at 48; Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 207, at 54–55 (discussing
predictive scores); HILLYGUS & SHIELDS, supra note 42, at 157–61 (explaining how campaigns identify friendly
voters for micro-targeting).
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mobilization instead of persuasion, the case for anti-distortion as a regulatory
rationale seems to become less compelling in this limited sense.
CONCLUSION
Hyperpolarization has important consequences for both campaign finance
and campaign finance law. On the one hand, the origins of modern campaign
finance law during the 1970s assumed political parties as important, but less
pivotal than the critical hubs for campaign finance activity than they are now.
Campaign finance law, as a result, misses crucial ways that the parties and party
relationships mediate so much of how modern campaign finance operates, as
well as how and why political money flows through the channels it does today.
Furthermore, as the number of uncommitted voters has shrunk and campaign
practices has correspondingly shifted, campaign finance no longer serves the
First Amendment interest in public persuasion and political education quite as
strongly as it did during the Cold War Era. On the other hand, the specific case
for campaign finance regulation based on anti-distortion, a classic intuition from
Austin about how political spending skews election outcomes from the
underlying distribution of public opinion, appears somehow less compelling
today for much the same reasons.
The important upshot is that campaign finance law, just like the law of
redistricting and election administration, originated during an exceptional period
of American history marked by unusually low levels of partisanship and
polarization that no longer applies today. Like the other areas of election law,
campaign finance law, too, would function more sensibly if it challenges and
updates its underlying assumptions about the central role parties and
partisanship play in today’s hyperpolarized political environment.
Campaign finance law itself has been a viciously partisan battlefield, with
Democrats favoring regulation and Republicans staking out an aggressively
deregulatory posture on campaign finance regulation. The Federal Election
Commission has been largely deadlocked in a partisan stalemate for a decade as
a result.229 That said, at least by comparison to redistricting and election
administration, campaign finance law arguably has been somewhat less prone to
strategic manipulation of election rules for partisan advantage. The major
229
See, e.g., Kate M. Harris, Case Note, Judicial Review of Deadlock Votes: Campaign Legal Center &
Democracy 21 v. Federal Election Commission (D.C. Cir. 2020), U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/18/fec-deadlock-harris/; Editorial, Elections in Peril with
Decimated Federal Election Commission, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/
opinion/editorials/elections-in-peril-with-decimated-fec/.
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parties’ positions on campaign finance law seem driven by ideology as much as
partisan self-interest. The parties’ opposed positions on the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, for instance, are hard to explain otherwise.230 As polarized as the
parties remain, however, the next stage for the hyperpartisan development of
campaign finance law may be exactly the same strategic manipulation of
election rules that we have seen in redistricting and election administration. The
partisan incentives are the same in campaign finance law, and the opportunities
likely no less.

230
See Evan Stephenson, Note, Game Theory and the Passage of McCain-Feingold: Why the Democrats
Willingly and Rationally Disadvantaged Themselves, 19 J.L. & POL. 425, 426 (2003). But see ALEC MACGILLIS,
THE CYNIC: THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MITCH MCCONNELL 54, 64–65 (2014) (arguing that Mitch
McConnell’s campaign finance positions were motivated by partisan self-interest).

